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Abstract
Classical game theory addresses decision problems in multi-agent environment
where one rational agent’s decision affects other agents’ payoffs. Game theory has
widespread application in economic, social and biological sciences. In recent years
quantum versions of classical games have been proposed and studied. In this paper,
we consider a quantum version of the classical Barro-Gordon game which captures
the problem of time inconsistency in monetary economics. Such time inconsistency
refers to the temptation of weak policy maker to implement high inflation when
the public expects low inflation. The inconsistency arises when the public punishes
the weak policy maker in the next cycle. We first present a quantum version of
the Barro-Gordon game. Next, we show that in a particular case of the quantum
game, time-consistent Nash equilibrium could be achieved when public expects low
inflation, thus resolving the game.
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HIGHLIGHTS
• We reformulate Barro-Gordon Game using quantum game theory.
• We use Marinatto-Weber approach for quantization of game theory.
• We find that the well-known time inconsistency in the classical game is removed
after quantization.
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1 Introduction
Game theory is a mathematical formulation of situations where, for two or
more agents, the outcome of an action by one of them depends not only on the
particular action taken by that agent but on the actions taken by the other (or
others)[1]. Game theory has gained much attention in recent years as indicated
by the many texts written on it [2,3,4,5]. After Neuman and Morgenstern’s
book [6], which was the first important text in game theory, John Nash made
important contributions to this theory [7,8]. However, application of game
theory to different areas such as economics, politics, biology, started in 1970’s
and has been growing ever since [1].
In recent years, game theory has attracted the attention of many physicists
as well. Among the many contributions that has come along from the physics
community is the inclusion of the rules of quantum mechanics in game the-
ory where quantum effects such as superposition and entanglement can play a
role [9,10]. Quantum game was introduced by Eisert, Wilkens, and Lewenstein
(EWL) [11], where the role of entanglement was considered first. Subsequently,
Marinatto and Weber (MW) [12] offered a more general scheme for quanti-
zation of games based on Hilbert space approach. It is now believed that
quantization of games can offer interesting situations where various dilemma
present in classical games can be removed. As a result of the above-mentioned
works, many authors have employed the quantization of various games. For
example, Cheon and Tsutsui [13], Fliteny and Hollenberg [14], Makowski [15]
and Landsburg [16] have used EWL approach. On the other hand, Arfi [17],
Deng et. al [18] and Frackiewicz [19], based their approach on MW scheme.
Much of the attention in the above-mentioned works has been paid to well-
known games such as prisoner’s dilemma game [11,13,14,17], while others have
considered various other games with social implications.
However, despite the growing interest in econophysics [20], little attention has
been paid to quantization of classical games in finance and economics. The
present work offers a step in this direction. Here, we intend to quantize the
classical game of Barro and Gordon (BG) in monetary economics employing
the MW scheme. We then study some specific cases of the quantum game
in order to find Nash equilibrium and the advantages quantization may of-
fer. BG game, to be explained in details in the following, is a classical game
which illustrates the problem of time inconsistency in monetary policy. Time
inconsistency was first introduced by Kydland and Prescott [21] and later by
Barro and Gordon [22]. The main idea is that when the output is inefficiently
low, policy maker can increase it by applying discretionary policy, causing
surprising inflation. In this situation, although the output increases which is
beneficial, it causes inflation, which is costly. Therefore, we encounter an infla-
tionary bias. Since BG introduced a noncooperative game between public and
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central bank, many researchers [23,24,25,26,27] have been using game theory
to study time inconsistency. All of these studies are based on the classical
game theory, while the principles of quantization has not been applied so far.
There are, however, a variety of reasons to apply the roles of quantum me-
chanics to various disciplines outside of traditional physics. For example, in
psychology and decision making theory, quantum cognition has gained much
attention [28,29]. In most such approaches, quantum probabilities are consid-
ered in order to represent certain uncertainty in decision making process. Fur-
thermore, a quantum Hamiltonian approach to various fields of social sciences
has also been considered [30,31,32,33,34,35] where operator-valued dynamical
variables are governed by a general Hamiltonian which includes all possible
interaction. However, we must note that while our approach in this paper is
similar in spirit, it is different in its basic assumption and methodology. The
problem of strategy selection which is the essence of game theory could be for-
mulated using the laws of quantum mechanics instead of classical probability
theory. In fact, it is the purely quantum mechanical concept of superposition
(of strategies) which provides the key ingredient in our approach to game
theory here.
Furthermore, micro-evolution teaches us that our selfish (microscopic) genes
may make our decision on a fundamental level, where quantum mechanics
may be relevant. Perhaps from a more practical point of view, recent advances
in quantum computational and quantum communication technology[36] may
help us in creating quantum devices which must take on quantum strategies
in order to solve problems [11]. It is with such motivations in mind that one
may consider quantum game theory in various fields of social sciences, and
consequently monetary economics in our present case.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we briefly describe
the problem of time inconsistency in monetary policy. The classical BG game
is then described in details in Section 3. In Section 4, we present our main
results of quantization of BG game and consider some specific cases of the
quantum game. The last section offers concluding remarks.
2 Time Inconsistency
A policy is time inconsistent or dynamic inconsistent when it is considered as
the best policy for particular time in the future, but it does not remain so,
when that particular time actually arrives. There are two possible mechanisms
that have been considered for such a time inconsistency. (i) Strotz [37] explains
that time inconsistency is because of changing preferences, (ii) Kydland and
Prescott [21] consider another explanation that is based on agent’s rational
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expectation. The main idea is, when people expect low inflation, central bank
finds the incentive for high inflation. If the public understand this incentive
and predict high inflation, the central bank finds it optimal to deliver the
public’s expectation and therefore implements high inflationary policy. There-
fore, while low inflation is the optimal policy for both banker and the public
to begin with, high inflation is eventually implemented. We use this second
mechanism in this paper as it is the concept of time inconsistency associated
with the Barro-Gordon game.
Barro and Gordon [22] have explained time inconsistency of monetary policy
as follow: in a discretionary regime, central banker can print more money and
make more inflation than people’s expectations. Benefits of this surprising
inflation might provide more economic activities or reduce government’s debt.
However, if people, due to their rational expectation, understand it and adjust
their expectations with it, then policy maker will not reach his goal at all.
This is simply due to the fact that inflationary advantages is best when it
is unanticipated. Besides that, due to increased money supply, the level of
prices will grow, which will have negative consequences for the policy maker.
The classical Barro-Gordon game captures the essence of this type of time-
inconsistency in the context of decisions (strategy) that a policy maker must
make and the expectations that the public can have. The actual game is
represented in two different formats where the strong policy maker implements
low inflation which is time consistent, while in the case of weak policy maker
a time inconsistent strategy is the alternative to a Nash equilibrium.
3 BG Classical Game
In BG game, similar to prisoners’s dilemma, there are two players; public and
central bank. In this game, one assumes that the public has rational expec-
tations. The public then predicts inflation by solving out the policy maker’s
optimization problem. On the other hand, the policy maker selects inflation
policy by considering the public’s inflationary expectations. In this paper, by
following Backus and Driffill [38] and Storger [39], we use a special version
of BG game. This version is easier to convert to quantum game due to hav-
ing a definitive payoff matrix. In this version, there are two types of policy
maker: weak policy maker, which uses discretionary policies and gains benefit
by making unanticipated inflation. In the other words, a weak policy maker
can cheat the public when they formed their low inflationary expectation at
the start of the period. Strong policy maker, on the other hand, commits to
zero inflation and is not interested in unanticipated inflation.
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The utility function of these policy makers is as follows:
Upolt = θb(pit − pi
e
t )−
api2t
2
(1)
where, pit and pi
e
t are actual inflation and expected inflation rates, respectively.
Inflationary cost is assumed to be proportional to the square of inflation and
therefore
api2
t
2
is the cost of inflation where a is an arbitrary cost parameter.
θ is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 for weak policy maker and 0 for
strong policy maker and b is a coefficient for benefit of inflation term with
b > 0 . If pit > pi
e
t then policy maker can decrease unemployment (according
to Philips curve 1 ) and gain benefit using the first term in Eq.(1). Public’s
utility function is as follows:
Upubt = −(pit − pi
e
t )
2. (2)
This function shows that every deviation from expected inflation causes disu-
tility for the public.
We next briefly review the payoff matrix for weak and strong policy maker as
obtained by [38,39]: First we use weak policy maker optimization. The weak
policy maker optimizes Eq.(1) without any constraint. By taking derivative
of Eq.(1) with respect to pit , optimal inflation will be pˆit =
b
a
. If piet =
b
a
,
replacing it in Eq.(1) and (2) will result in Upolt = −
b2
2a
< Upubt = 0. Therefore,
in this case, weak policy maker cannot gain any benefit and this strategy will
not be chosen. On the other hand, optimizing unconstraint Eq.(2), with the
assumption of public rational expectations, results in pit = pi
e
t . If weak policy
maker commits to zero inflation, both players will receive zero payoff. However,
if the public expects zero inflation, and the weak policy maker implements
pit =
b
a
, then he can gain some benefit (equal to b
2
2a
) and the public will incur
losses of −( b
a
)2 . Therefore, we have Upolt =
b2
2a
> Upubt = −(
b
b
)2 and the weak
policy maker therefore prefers this strategy. Even if the public expects piet =
b
a
and the policy maker chooses pit =
b
a
, he can get more payoff than choosing
zero inflation. Thus, pit = 0 is a dominated strategy and will never be selected.
Following [38], normalization condition (a = b = 2), leads to a simple payoff
matrix for the weak policy maker as shown in Table 1. Note that the case
of pit = 1 , pi
e
t = 1 is a Nash equilibrium in this case. However, the actual
equilibrium is the case of pit = 1 , pi
e
t = 0 if the policy maker is successful
in cheating the public . The key point here is that this equilibrium (pit = 1
, piet = 0) is time inconsistent because pi
e
t = 0 is announced but pi
e
t = 1 is
implemented.
In the case of strong policy maker (θ = 0 ), pit =
b
a
is never chosen as it is a
dominated strategy. Strong policy maker will incur a loss equal to−b
2
2a
in both
1 Philips curve shows an inverse relation between the unemployment and inflation.
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θ = 1 Public
piet = 0 pi
e
t = 1
Weak policy maker pit = 0 (0,0) (-2,-1)
pit = 1 (1,-1) (-1,0)
Table 1
Weak policy maker payoff
cases (either the public expects zero inflation or b
a
). Therefore, pit = 0 is the
best policy for strong policy maker and therefore always commits to it. In this
situation, there would be no problem of time inconsistency. Therefore, (pit = 0,
piet = 0) is the Nash equilibrium for this case and it is time consistent.
θ = 0 Public
piet = 0 pi
e
t = 1
Strong policy maker pit = 0 (0,0) (0,-1)
pit = 1 (-1,-1) (-1,0)
Table 2
Strong policy maker payoff
Barro and Gordon [22] showed that the weak policy maker loses his reputation
for cheating the public. In fact, in the next period, public plays “tit for tat”
game and punish the weak policy maker by adjusting their expectations. In
other words, if pit−1 = pi
e
t−1then pit = pi
e
t = 0 ; otherwise, pit = pi
e
t =
b
a
.
Therefore, weak policy maker compares marginal cost and benefit of cheating
the public, and then decides to make unanticipated inflation. Consequently,
classical BG game needs two time periods to solve the game between the public
and weak policy maker. In this paper we generalize this classical game to a
quantum framework and ask if it can be made more efficient.
4 Quantum BG Game
4.1 Quantization of the game
There is essentially two different ways to quantized classical games in the
literature. EWL [13,14,15,16] took the original steps in this regard. However,
the approach of MW [17,18,19] has been more widely used recently and we
intend to use their approach in quantizing BG game.
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Frackiewicz [19] argued that, in EWL method, the result of the game depends
on many parameters because each player’s strategy is a unitary operator.
Therefore it has cumbersome calculation. But in MW, player’s local operators
were performed on some fixed entangled state |ψ〉. It seems that MW is sim-
pler than EWL [40]. We therefore use the MW method to quantize the game
between weak policy maker and the public. In this game, there are two play-
ers: weak policy maker (M) and public (U). Each player has two strategies:
high inflation (H) and low inflation (L). Consider a four- dimensional Hilbert
space, H , as the strategy space in ket notion:
H = HM ⊗HU = {|LL〉 , |LH〉 , |HL〉 , |HH〉} (3)
where the first qubit is related to the state of the policy maker and the second
one to that of public. Kets show a given strategy in strategy space which in
quantum version is a Hilbert space. Therefore, we use an arbitrary quantum
strategy as a normalized state vector,|ψi〉.
|ψi〉 = α |LL〉 + γ |LH〉+ δ |HL〉+ β |HH〉 (4)
Where |α|2, |β|2, |γ|2, |δ|2 are probability of observing the strategies of (L, L),
(H, H), (L, H) and (H, L), respectively, with |α|2+|γ|2+|δ|2+|β|2 = 1. Density
matrix is written as ρi = |ψi〉 〈ψi|. Let C be a unitary Hermitian operator (i.e,
C† = C = C−1), such that C |H〉 = |L〉 and C |L〉 = |H〉 and I is the identity
operator such that I |H〉 = |H〉 and I |L〉 = |L〉 . In the game, policy maker
and [public] use operators I and C with probabilities of p, (1− p), [q, (1− q)].
Final density matrix for this system is as follows:
ρf = pq
[
(IM ⊗ IU)ρi(I
†
M ⊗ I
†
U)
]
+p(1− q)
[
(IM ⊗ CU)ρi(I
†
M ⊗ C
†
U)
]
+(1− p)q
[
(CM ⊗ IU)ρi(C
†
M ⊗ I
†
U)
]
+(1− p)(1− q)
[
(CM ⊗ CU)ρi(C
†
M ⊗ C
†
U)
]
(5)
and the two payoff operators are given as follows:
PM = 0 |LL〉 〈 LL| − 2 |LH〉 〈 LH|+ |HL〉 〈 HL| − |HH〉 〈 HH| (6)
PU = 0 |LL〉 〈 LL| − |LH〉 〈 LH| − |HL〉 〈 HL|+ 0 |HH〉 〈 HH| . (7)
Finally, payoff functions are calculated according to:
$¯M(p, q) = Tr(PMρf ) (8)
$¯U(p, q) = Tr(PUρf ). (9)
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This can be written as:
$¯M(p, q) = ΦΩγ
T
M (10)
$¯U(p, q) = ΦΩγ
T
U (11)
where
Φ = [pq, p(1− q), (1− p)q, (1− p)(1− q)] (12)
Ω =


α2 γ2 δ2 β2
δ2 β2 α2 γ2
γ2 α2 β2 δ2
β2 δ2 γ2 α2


γM = [0,−2, 1,−1]
γU = [0,−1,−1, 0].
The payoff functions for policy maker and public are therefore calculated as:
$¯M(p, q) = 2p(α
2− β2 + δ2− γ2) + q(δ2− α2− γ2 + β2)−α2 + γ2− 2δ2 (13)
$¯U(p, q) = (1− 2(δ
2 + γ2))(q(2p− 1)− p)− (δ2 + γ2) (14)
In order for Nash equilibrium to exist one needs to implement the following
conditions [12]:
$¯M(p
∗, q∗)− $¯M(p, q
∗) ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1] (15)
$¯U(p
∗, q∗)− $¯U(p
∗, q) ≥ 0, ∀q ∈ [0, 1] (16)
which in our case lead to:
2(p∗ − p)(α2 − β2 + δ2 − γ2) ≥ 0 (17)
(1− 2(δ2 + γ2))(q∗ − q)(2p∗ − 1) ≥ 0. (18)
4.2 Analysis of the game
Equation (13-14) and (17-18) are our main results. Following MW’s approach,
we consider the validity of three possible situations below:
(a) p∗ = q∗ = 1
In this case the payoffs are as follows:
$¯M(1, 1) = −β
2 − 2γ2 + δ2 (19)
$¯U(1, 1) = −γ
2 − δ2 (20)
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And Nash equilibrium conditions are:
2(1− p)(α2 − β2 + δ2 − γ2) ≥ 0 (21)
(1− 2(δ2 + γ2))(1− q) ≥ 0⇒ γ2 + δ2 ≤ 1/2. (22)
If α2+δ2 > β2+γ2 , then the first Nash equilibrium condition will be satisfied.
In fact, this condition will most likely be satisfied for the weak policy maker
which we are considering here, since according to Table (1), he prefers (L,L) or
(H,L) strategies rather than (H,H) or (L,H) strategies. We thus assume that
for weak policy maker the condition of α2 + δ2 > β2 + γ2 is always true. The
second Nash equilibrium condition may or may not be satisfied depending on
the choice of the quantum strategy. We will return to this point later on in
this paper.
(b) p∗ = q∗ = 0
In this case the payoffs are as follows:
$¯M(0, 0) = −α
2 + γ2 − 2δ2 (23)
$¯U(0, 0) = −γ
2 − δ2 (24)
and Nash equilibrium conditions are calculated as:
− 2p(α2 − β2 + δ2 − γ2) ≥ 0 (25)
(1− 2(δ2 + γ2))q ≥ 0⇒ γ2 + δ2 ≤ 1/2 (26)
In this case, Nash equilibrium will be satisfied if α2 + δ2 < β2 + γ2 which is
exactly the opposite of the previous case. Again, since we are considering a
weak policy maker here (see above), we will consider this condition as unac-
ceptable. Therefore, we do not consider Nash equilibrium to hold for the weak
policy maker in the case of p∗ = q∗ = 0.
(c) p∗ = q∗ = 1/2
In this case the payoffs are as follows:
$¯M(1/2, 1/2) = −1/2 (27)
$¯U(1/2, 1/2) = −1/2 (28)
and Nash equilibrium conditions are calculated as:
2(1/2− p)(α2 − β2 + δ2 − γ2) ≥ 0 (29)
(1− 2(δ2 + γ2))(1/2− q)(1− 1) = 0 (30)
The second Nash equilibrium condition is trivially satisfied. However, the first
Nash equilibrium condition is clearly violated for p > 1/2 for a weak policy
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maker (i.e. α2−β2+ δ2−γ2 > 0). But since in this scenario both players have
negative payoff, this equilibrium is not preferred.
Therefore among the three possibilities we have considered above, the second
scenario (b) could not be satisfied because Nash equilibrium did not exist and
the third scenario (c) included dominated strategies. We therefore choose to
only consider the first scenario (a). However, the first scenario could satisfy
Nash equilibrium depending on the choice of quantum strategies, i.e. choice
of α, β, δ, γ . In the following we consider two different quantum strategies of
weak policy maker where Nash equilibrium could potentially exist:
(i) Suppose that the public has false prediction about inflation. It means that,
quantum strategy is a superposition of two strategies, (L, H) and (H, L) where
α = β = 0:
|ψi〉 = γ |LH〉+ δ |HL〉 . (31)
Therefore, payoff functions will be as follows:
$¯M(1, 1) = −2γ
2 + δ2 (32)
$¯U(1, 1) = −γ
2 − δ2 = −1 (33)
And Nash equilibrium conditions:
2(1− p)(δ2 − γ2) ≥ 0 (34)
γ2 + δ2 ≤ 1/2 (35)
In this case, the public would always lose due to false expectations, i.e. Eq.
(33). However weak policy maker can earn better a payoff if δ2 > 2γ2. However,
this scenario cannot imply a stable situation due to Eq. (35) which indicate
that Nash equilibrium can never be obtained since γ2 + δ2 = 1. This result is
reminiscent of the classical version of the game where the weak policy maker
can earn positive payoff by cheating the public for just one cycle. Afterwards,
the public will punish him and correct their expectation. Here, we showed that
a quantum strategy that is superposition of false prediction strategies is not
a Nash equilibrium. In other word, it is not a sustainable equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose that public has correct prediction about the inflation. Therefore,
quantum strategy is a superposition of two strategies, (L, L) and (H, H) where
γ = δ = 0:
|ψi〉 = α |LL〉+ β |HH〉 (36)
$¯M(1, 1) = −β
2 (37)
$¯U(1, 1) = 0 (38)
Thus Nash equilibrium conditions in this case are:
2(1− p)(α2 − β2) ≥ 0 (39)
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(1− q) ≥ 0 (40)
The second Nash equilibrium condition (Eq. 40) is always true. However, the
first one (Eq. 39) will be satisfied for α2 > β2 which is an acceptable condition
for the weak policy maker. This shows that the larger the share of (L, L)
strategy is chosen (α) the smaller the negative payoff of policy maker becomes
(β). The important point here is that a Nash equilibrium exist for the weak
policy maker where the public is guaranteed not to lose and the policy maker’s
loss can be minimized by reducing β. In fact, in an extreme case β → 0, where
the quantum strategy converges to a (non-superposition) single strategy (L,L),
the payoff of both players will be zero as in the classical case (see Table
(1)). However the important difference is that Nash equilibrium is satisfied
here, where in the classical version it is not. Therefore, the quantum version
of the game in this scenario offers a time consistent Nash equilibrium. This
constitutes our main result.
5 Concluding Remarks
Barro and Gordon proposed a game between the public and policy maker
based on the theory of time inconsistency. In this game, a weak policy maker
can earn some benefits in short time by cheating the public about inflation.
However, the public will punish him in the next period. Therefore, inflation
increases and policy maker will lose his benefits. Thus, in this classical version
of BG game, the implementation of low inflation by the weak policy maker is
not a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we generalized the BG game by using
the quantum game scheme according to Marinatto and Weber. We considered
the quantum game as a superposition of four classical strategies, and Nash
equilibrium conditions were subsequently calculated. The results showed that
among the three possibilities we have considered, the first scenario was more
acceptable. Then we considered two different quantum strategies of weak pol-
icy maker where Nash equilibrium could potentially exist:(i) public has false
prediction and (ii) public has a correct prediction. It was shown that Nash
equilibrium was not satisfied when the public has false prediction. However,
we obtained a Nash equilibrium that is time consistent in the second scenario
where the public has a correct prediction about inflation. Our result is impor-
tant since it shows that in the quantum version of BG game, unlike its classical
version, the low inflation policy is a Nash equilibrium when the public expects
low inflation thus removing the time inconsistency and therefore solving the
game. We emphasize that the purely quantum effect of superposition entan-
gled states was the key ingredient in solving the game and removing the time
inconsistency present in the classical version.
We next briefly comment on some issues regarding our results. The relevance
of quantum game may at first glance seem a bit peculiar despite the motiva-
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tions provided in the Introduction (Section 1) above. Ever since 1935 when
Schrodinger introduced what is now known as the Schrodinger cat, the possi-
bility of macroscopic superposition states was debated in the literature. How-
ever, quantum technology has provided for macroscopic superposition states
[41], and one can imagine that with sufficiently advanced technology, future
machines could employ strategies that could benefit from quantum game the-
ory. Furthermore, one may ask if our results would be different if we had em-
ployed other methods besides MW for game quantization. Arfi[17] has shown
that one would obtain the same results for prisoner’s dilemma game regardless
of the method of quantization. We chose the MW method since it suited our
game in a more straightforward way. However, one can imagine that employing
the method of EWL would lead to essentially the same results. The impor-
tant point that seems to be the common point of most game quantization is
that quantum games offer an advantage over their classical version because
they employ superposition principle and are thus able to resolve the conflict
existing in the classical version. We have also obtained the same essential re-
sults here, and suspect that our result would be independent of the method
of quantization.
Our aim here has been to provide an example of quantum game theory in
economics and how the rules of quantum mechanics may offer advantages in
this regard. However, one might consider further work along the same line pre-
sented here. For example, one can consider the possibility of other equilibria
that might exist for the case of various other choices of p and q besides the
ones considered here (which were purely motivated by previous studies). An-
other interesting avenue would be to consider a Hamiltonian formulation and
thus the time evolution of various operators along the line of [31,34,35]. This
might be interesting as dynamical evolution would become quantum mechan-
ical and one might consider the different evolution of an initially (quantum)
superposition state vs. its classical analog of a mixed state.
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